Response To Sher

[Amandeep Hindustani]

Soft Target was the laughing stock of books related to the Air India act of terrorism. In fact, it is out of circulation mostly because it sucked so badly.

The authentic reports comes from the Canadian Government under the respected Judge Major. You guys should read that as well. Anycase, back to the topic.

[chatanga1]

Let me correct you. He killed the so called moolnivasi for praying for the wrong reason.

Is that why your people like to kill those who read different prayers?

Soft Target was the laughing stock of books related to the Air India act of terrorism. .

I have read (unfortunately) many books on the Panjab subject, which are not only a laughing stock, but an environmental crime, as they have destroyed valuable natural assets to produce something that is worth nothing to a person with an ounce of education.

knights of falsehood by gill

OPS the true story by brar

the 3rd sikh war by bhutani

and so on.

[dalsingh101]

The Mulraj revolt was technically a revolt against the Khalsa Raj as the British according to the treaty of Bhyrolwal were the regents acting on behalf of the Maharaja.

What a phudhu.....

Is that how deep your hogi arse-licking goes? Now the British are protectors of Khalsa raj in your warped head.

The British destroyed the Khalsa raj. Sikh soldiers were under less of an illusion than anyone else regarding Anglo political/military motives/agenda.

[Amandeep Hindustani]

books written by the hindus for the hindus. how would you find any reference to other communities? and what reference would you be looking for?

"we, invaded their lands, and took over them".

What other books are you looking for? Perhaps, you can cite something in the bible, koran, sggs that talk about the above topic? The AIT theory has been debunked primarily by the person who popularized it in modern India - Sharmilla Bose.

[Amandeep Hindustani]

Is that why your people like to kill those who read different prayers?

I have read (unfortunately) many books on the Panjab subject, which are not only a laughing stock, but an environmental crime, as they have destroyed valuable natural assets to produce something that is worth nothing to a person with an ounce of education.

knights of falsehood by gill

OPS the true story by brar

the 3rd sikh war by bhutani

and so on.

Perhaps.

But Justice Major's report is the stamp on the Air India conspiracy. It clearly says the GOI warned the Canadian Government no less than 6 times about a possible terror attack. The Canadian Government did nothing hence all the new rule changes for the RCMP and CSIS.

It also goes onto say the Air India terror attack was the work of sikh militants.

So, your "soft target" book gets blown out of the water, and out of circulation that is how preposterous it was.

[chatanga1]

But Justice Major's report is the stamp on the Air India conspiracy. It clearly says the GOI warned the Canadian Government no less than 6 times about a possible terror attack. The Canadian Government did nothing hence all the new rule changes for the RCMP and CSIS.

The term "a possible terror attack" is so vague. And that coming from a country which has purposely sought to malign Sikhs, home and abroad as extremists or militants, just because they wanted to have equal rights in their homeland.

Do you think that if the indians instaed of their scaremongering propoganda had presented evidence to the canadian govt, there may have been a different approach?

I did not responded to the idiotic post as I have been sick and tired trying to drill some sense into these khali numbskulls.

another mother selling hindu panjabi bites the dust. meekly.

[chatanga1]

The British destroyed the Khalsa raj. Sikh soldiers were under less of an illusion than anyone else regarding Anglo political/military motives/agenda.

The british destroyed it, under the cover of maintaining the lahore kingdom. The Sikh soldiers may have been under less of an illusion, but it was the Sikh nobility's failure to carry the war that lead to the british destroying the rule.

The Mulraj revolt was technically a revolt against the Khalsa Raj as the British according to the treaty of Bhyrolwal were the regents acting on behalf of the Maharaja.

Technically it was a revolt against the Lahore Kingdom, but it wasn't aimed at Maharaja Duleep Singh, it was aimed at the hand that controlled the Kingdom, the british.

Edited June 11, 2014 by chatanga1

[chatanga1]

What a phudhu.....

Is that how deep your hogi arse-licking goes? Now the British are protectors of Khalsa raj in your warped head.

The British destroyed the Khalsa raj. Sikh soldiers were under less of an illusion than anyone else regarding Anglo political/military motives/agenda.

how come you keep that brilliant mind (and mouth) shut when these hindu panjabis spew their warped views on this forum?

[Amandeep Hindustani]

The term "a possible terror attack" is so vague. And that coming from a country which has purposely sought to malign Sikhs, home and abroad as extremists or militants, just because they wanted to have equal rights in their homeland.

Do you think that if the indians instaed of their scaremongering propoganda had presented evidence to the canadian govt, there may have been a different approach?

another mother selling hindu panjabi bites the dust. meekly.

Let me amend my statement. I have not read the report in a long time but the GOI warned the Canadian Government about a possible attack against Air India specifically. And if you want to really get specific the GOI named certain individuals on Canadian soil. The onus of investigation therefore was on the Canadian government. They did a half assed job as admitted in the report. Here is the report for your convenience. It is damning. And here is a snippet.

http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/air_india/2010-07-23/www.majorcomm.ca/en/reports/finalreport/default.html.

Key Findings of the Commission of Inquiry into the

Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182

PRE‐BOMBING

• Government agencies were in possession of significant pieces of information that, taken

together, would have led a competent analyst to conclude that Flight 182 was at high risk of

being bombed by known Sikh terrorists in June 1985.

• James Bartleman’s evidence that, shortly before the bombing, he saw a specific threat to Air

India Flight 182, is credible. The Commission accepts the possibility that such a document would

have been ignored and then subsequently have gone missing.

• Additional, highly classified, threat information was in the possession of the Communications

Security Establishment (CSE). This information, which was received by the Commission after the

close of the hearings, was consistent with other information about the threat of sabotage and

hijacking by Sikh extremists in June 1985, and indicated that Indian airports were undertaking

security audits in response to the threat.

• Even without the evidence of James Bartleman and the CSE information, the Commission finds

that the amount of information collectively held by the Government made the failure to

implement appropriate anti‐sabotage measures inexcusable.

• The view of Canadian officials prior to the bombing that government‐owned Air India was

“crying wolf” in order to obtain additional security for free was misguided.

• The institutional arrangements and practices of information‐gathering agencies were wholly

deficient in terms of internal and external sharing of information, as well as analysis.

• Government agencies failed to appreciate the nature and the seriousness of the threat of Sikh

extremism.

• The five‐month delay in CSIS’ application to intercept Parmar’s communications, which was a

result of a warrant conversion process that prioritized existing warrants over new applications,

was entirely disproportionate to the level of the threat.

• CSIS surveillance was ineffective. Surveillants were unable to distinguish one traditionally

attired Sikh from another. When a CSIS surveillance team observed experiments involving a test

explosion conducted by Sikh extremists in the woods in Duncan B.C. in June 1985 (the Duncan

Blast), the loud sound heard was misinterpreted as a gunshot. No photograph was taken of the

unknown third person present (Mr. X.) because surveillants had not brought a camera.

2

• CSIS failed to include important information, such as the Duncan Blast, in the threat

assessments it provided to the RCMP and Transport Canada.

• The RCMP wasted resources creating a threat assessment structure parallel to CSIS’. The RCMP

structure was itself ineffective ‐ it failed to identify, report, and share threat information.

• The RCMP failed to transmit the June 1st Telex, warning about the possibility of bombing with

time‐delayed devices in June 1985, to either CSIS or to Transport Canada.

• Excessive secrecy in information sharing prevented any one agency from obtaining all necessary

information to assess the threat. Excessive secrecy also prevented those on the frontlines from

obtaining information necessary to put in place security measures responsive to the threat.

• Effective protective measures were not implemented in response to the threat to Air India Flight

182.

• The concept of “specific threat” was misunderstood and misapplied. When a call‐in bomb

threat was deemed to be “specific,” it would trigger an elaborate airport emergency protocol

which, had it been employed on June 22, 1985, would likely have identified the bomb. This

protocol had no application outside of the call‐in threat situation. When intelligence was

received through other channels, a lack of extreme specificity was at times wrongly used to deny

additional protective resources.

• Today, the concept of specific threat has become an excuse to explain why more was not done

to prevent the bombing on June 22, 1985.

• Security measures in response to possible threats to aviation were poorly thought out and

mechanically applied. They were not tailored to meet the particular nature of the threat.

• Despite the knowledge of the threat of sabotage, Transport Canada and RCMP Protective

Policing displayed a lack of flexibility by continuing to rely on anti‐hijacking security measures,

which did not address the threat of bombing.

• There was a lack of cooperation and communication within the RCMP and between RCMP,

Transport Canada and airlines in relation to airport security.

• Although Air India was operating under an elevated threat level, CP Air (the airline upon which

[Guest]

Enough said on this topic, topic locked.